A disastrous gamble: Czechoslovak-British relations, 1937-1942 by Heitschmidt, Traci Colston
UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations 
1-1-1994 
A disastrous gamble: Czechoslovak-British relations, 1937-1942 
Traci Colston Heitschmidt 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds 
Repository Citation 
Heitschmidt, Traci Colston, "A disastrous gamble: Czechoslovak-British relations, 1937-1942" (1994). 
UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations. 379. 
https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds/379 
This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV 
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the 
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from 
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself. 
 
This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu. 
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may 
be from any type of computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate 
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in 
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order.
University Microfilms International 
A Bell & Howell Information C om pany  
3 0 0  North Z e eb  Road. Ann Arbor. Ml 4 8 1 06-1346  USA  
3 1 3 /7 6 1 -4 7 0 0  8 0 0 /5 2 1 -0 6 0 0

Order Number 1359240
A disastrous gamble: Czechoslovak-British relations, 1937-1942
Heitschmidt, Traci Colston, M.A.
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 1994
UMI
300 N. ZeebRd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

A Disastrous Gamble: 
Czechoslovak-British Relations, 
1937-1942
by
Traci Colston Heitschmidt
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in
History
Department of History 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
May 1994
The Thesis of Traci Colston Heitschmidt for the degree of 
Master in Arts in History is approved.
' A J q u a c h  U l . / f ?
Ch-air personO Nancy Wingfield,’ •PhiD.
Zo , cf. ciL .
a ?. Y- °iY
Examining Committee Member, Colin Loader, Ph.D.
-7.
Examining Committee Member, Vernon Mattson, Ph.D.
Graduate Faculty Representative, Ralph Buechler, Ph.D.
7
Dean of the Graduate College, Ronald Smith, Ph.D.
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
May 1994
ABSTRACT
The appeasement policy culminated with the Munich 
Agreement in September 1938 and its effects are still being 
felt today. Because of his preconceived notions and 
inflexible world view, British Prime Minister Chamberlain 
did not listen to the pleas of those who opposed 
appeasement. He ignored their opinions about military 
build-up, possible German war aims, or anything else that 
challenged the viability of his appeasement policy. 
Ultimately, Chamberlain's tunnel vision caused the 
destruction of the democratic country of Czechoslovakia and 
promoted the most destructive war in human history. The 
purpose of this thesis is to analyze Chamberlain's 
justifications, the strategies of his opponents (focusing 
on the British and Czechoslovak opposition), British public 
opinion, demonstrate the Czechoslovak government's position 
from 1938 to 1942 and analyze its struggle to reverse the 
repercussions of an agreement they considered a Diktat.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Second World War, the term 
"Munich" has been consistently used as an excuse for 
maintaining nonnegotiable diplomatic positions, such as 
opposing the seating of People's Republic of China in the 
United Nations, and maintaining the United States' military 
stance in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. In July 1955, Vice 
President Richard Nixon was so concerned that President 
Dwight Eisenhower, on his return from the Geneva Summit 
where he had met with British, French, and Soviet leaders, 
would be associated with Chamberlain and his ever-present 
umbrella, that he forbade the use of umbrellas at the 
airport presidential speech.1 Although probably an 
overreaction, Nixon feared repercussions if the public 
associated Eisenhower with Chamberlain and his notorious 
appeasement policy. Although not as influential today, 
"myth of Munich" still plays an important role in the world
'Keith Eubank., Munich. (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1963): 298. Eisenhower met with the British, French, 
and Soviet leaders in Geneva to discuss post-war policies 
including Western occupation of Berlin. Eisenhower staunchly 
rejected the Soviet ultimatum that the West withdraw their 
troops from Berlin.
1
2of foreign policy. The term appeasement is unpalatable, 
and political association with it could mean disaster for 
prospective politicians.
The "myth of Munich" is also of interest to historians 
who battle over the origins and effects of the Diktat.
Some contend that Chamberlain had no choice but to sign the 
Munich Agreement because the British military remained 
weak. They believe that Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler did 
not just trick British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain 
into agreeing with him but left Chamberlain with no other 
viable options.2 Other historians argue that 
Chamberlain's reasons were justified and the Munich 
Agreement was ultimately a success because it allowed Great 
Britain another year to prepare for war. If war had 
started in 1938 instead of 1939, they believe, Germany 
probably would have won the Battle of Britain. They argue 
that the Czechoslovak military was weak and the Soviet 
Union would not have honored its treaty to come to the aid 
of Czechoslovakia if the Germans attacked, leaving Britain 
and France to face the German war machine alone.3 Some 
historians have even insisted that Czechoslovakia should be 
thankful for Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. They 
compare the 100,000 Czechoslovak casualties during the war
2John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy 
(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1948).
3Eubank, Munich.
3to the 6,500,000 Polish casualties, claiming that this 
discrepancy is the result of Polish unwillingness to 
surrender to Germany without a fight.4 Other historians 
contend that the appeasement policy was not flawed but 
Chamberlain's mistakes were getting involved with the 
German-Czechoslovak problem and trying to negotiate with 
Hitler from a weakened position. For these historians, the 
lesson of Munich is one all democratic countries should 
study before getting involved with dictators.5
The problem with these arguments is the misplacement 
of responsibility. Although some of Chamberlain's 
reasoning at the Munich Conference might be understandable, 
the blame must be laid on his entire policy of appeasement. 
The appeasement of Germany was a erroneous policy adopted 
by Chamberlain, culminating with the Munich Agreement, and 
contributing to the loss of forty million lives in the 
Second World War.
Chamberlain had several honorable if narrow and 
mistaken reasons for pursuing appeasement which led to the 
Munich Conference and the eventual German occupation of the 
Czech Lands. In the late 1930s, not only the British
4A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War 
(New York: MacMillian Publishing Company, 1961), XXVII.
These figures do not include the 260,000 Czechoslovak Jews or 
the 2,800,000 Polish Jews murdered by the Nazis. Paul R. 
Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinhart, eds. The Jew in the Modern 
World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 520.
5Laurence Thompson, The Greatest Treason: The Untold
Story of Munich (New York: William Morrow & Company, 1968).
4government but other governments around the world 
considered appeasement a viable option for dealing with 
Hitler. Chamberlain's and his supporters' reasons for 
adopting the appeasement policy were diverse. They assumed 
that Hitler was a "normal" leader of state who could be 
dealt with in traditional diplomatic terms. They believed 
Europe could not endure another bloodletting like that of 
the First World War. There were many British politicians 
who correctly feared that another world war would surely 
cause the destruction of the already declining British 
Empire.6 Flaws in the Treaty of Versailles, signed after 
the First World War, were used to justify yielding to 
German demands, the rationale being to correct the apparent 
injustices imposed on Germany by the victors after the war.
Although the appeasement policy was publicly and 
politically sanctioned in Britain until its obvious failure 
on 15 March 1939, a large minority of people consistently 
opposed pacifying Hitler at any cost throughout the late 
1930s. They too had valid reasons for their political 
views; primarily they wanted to continue Britain's policy 
of maintaining the balance of power on the continent. 
Germany, they feared, was significantly altering this 
balance and they believed that for the sake of world peace, 
Germany should be contained.
6Hermann Rauschning, "Is Chamberlain Right?" Spectator 
(3 February 1939) , 167.
Because of his preconceived notions and inflexible 
world view, Chamberlain did not listen to the pleas of 
those who opposed appeasement. He ignored their opinions 
about military build-up, possible German war aims, or 
anything else that challenged the viability of his 
appeasement policy. Ultimately, Chamberlain's tunnel 
vision caused the destruction of Czechoslovakia and 
promoted the most destructive war in human history.
Had the Prime Minister not pressured Czechoslovakia 
into surrendering the Sudeten Lands to Germany, the Third 
Reich would not have gained control of vital Czechoslovak 
resources and industries and been able to begin and 
prosecute the war as long as it did. The Czechoslovak 
military was well respected throughout Europe, and coupled 
with the natural barrier mountains in the Sudeten Lands 
created, it would have posed a considerable threat to the 
German war machine and possibly hastened the end of the war 
or prevented its expansion on a worldwide scale. Certainly 
Hitler appreciated the importance of the Czechoslovak 
resources in his quest for Lebensraum [living space] and 
had no concern for continental balance of power. On 15 
March 1939, the Wehrmacht occupied rump Czechoslovakia. The 
German occupiers terrorized the Czechoslovak people, forced 
the division of the country and the formation of the 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the puppet state of 
Slovakia, stripped the territory of its vital industries
6and resources, and used the newly acquired strategic 
position to gain access to Ukrainian oil and to attack 
Poland. The opponents of appeasement were correct in their 
analysis of Hitler and his real intentions, but their pleas 
to prepare Britain militarily for another war and to 
recognize the military and strategic importance of 
Czechoslovakia, made no impression on Chamberlain. In 1938 
and 1939, Hitler had free rein in Eastern Europe.
CHAPTER 2
ORIGINS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Democracy of the West today is the forerunner 
of Marxism, which would be inconceivable 
without it. It is democracy alone which 
furnishes this universal plague with the soil 
in which it spreads. In parliamentarianism, 
its outward form of expression, democracy 
created a monstrosity of filth and fire.
--Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf
The modern Czechoslovak state dates from the Paris 
Peace Conference following the First World War. At this 
meeting the victorious Entente powers established new 
countries in East Central Europe in the name of self- 
determination of peoples as delineated in Woodrow Wilson's 
Fourteen Points.7 One of these nascent countries was 
Czechoslovakia, which was carved out of the former Austria- 
Hungary.8 Czechoslovakia's borders were based not only on
7In the tenth point of his Fourteen Points, Woodrow 
Wilson argued that the peoples of Austria-Hungary should be 
accorded autonomy. E.H. Carr, International Relations 
Between the Two World Wars (1919-1939) (New York: St Martin's 
Press, 1963), 283.
80n the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, see Z. A. B. 
Zeman, The Break-Up of the Habsburg Empire, 1914-1918. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961) and, Mark Cornwall, 
ed. The Last Years of Austria-Hungary: Essays in Political
and Military History 1908-1918. (Exeter: University of Exeter 
Press, 1990). On the creation of Czechoslovakia, see: 
Dagmar Perman, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State: 
Diplomatic History of the Boundaries of Czechoslovakia, 1914- 
1920. Studies on East European History, Vol. 7. (Leiden: C.
7
8ethnic claims, but also on historic, strategic, and 
geographic considerations. Next to Yugoslavia, it was the 
most heterogeneous of the successor states. The other 
countries in the region moved toward some form of 
dictatorship during the interwar period, and by 1936 
Czechoslovakia remained the only country in Central Europe 
in which real parliamentary government, based on the 
ballot, universal suffrage, and free elections, still 
survived.9
The key element in interwar Czechoslovak foreign 
policy was collective security. Czechoslovakia's leaders 
tried not to align themselves with any one major power but 
rather sought a unified defense against any foreign threat. 
Edvard Benes, the Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1918 to 
1935 and six times chairman of the Council of the League of 
Nations and once President to the Assembly, was the 
architect of interwar Czechoslovak foreign policy.10 He 
later served as President of Czechoslovakia from 1935 to
J. Brill, 1962).
9R.W. Seton-Watson, "Czechoslovakia in its European 
Setting," Slavonic and East European Review (1936-1937): 113.
l0Edward Taborsky, President Edvard Benes : Between East
and West 1938-1948 (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press,
1981), 85. See also Edvard Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes: 
From Munich to New War and New Victory (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1954) .
91938 and 1945 to 1948.11 During the interwar period, 
Czechoslovakia supported the League of Nations, 
disarmament, collective security, the Little Entente 
(comprising Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania), and 
mutual assistance treaties with France and the Soviet 
Union.12 The treaty with France, signed in October 1925, 
bound France to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia if it 
were attacked. Czechoslovak leaders also negotiated a 
defensive alliance with the Soviet Union in May 1935.13
During the interwar years, Benes' solid reputation 
improved his country's international profile. He was 
respected as a shrewd politician and well known in 
political circles as a just man. He made numerous trips 
abroad between 1920 and 1928 and was described by most
politicians as a master tactician with a quick mind and an
uncanny ability to anticipate opportunities.14 Benes' 
circle of acquaintances was wide. The world renowned
author and acquaintance of Benes, H.G. Wells, described him
uFor discussion of his presidency, see for example, John 
0. Crane and Sylvia Crane, Czechoslovakia: Anvil of the Cold 
War (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 85.
12Ibid, 118.
13 Robert 0. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century 
(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1975), 423.
I4Piotr S. Wandycz, "Foreign Policy of Edvard Benes, 
1918-1938," in Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luza, eds. A 
History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1948 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1964), 217.
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as a great and world statesman.15 Throughout most of the 
interwar period, however, Western public opinion remained 
relatively ignorant of him and the country he represented. 
However, by the late 1930s, this had changed. In 1938, 
Ernst Eisenlohr, the German Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, 
noted:
Czechoslovakia, whose name was formerly 
almost unknown in Great Britain, where hardly 
anybody was inclined to bother about Prague's 
difficulties, today commands a solid block of 
supporters in the newspaper world, the 
Liberal and Socialist Parties and their 
Members of Parliament, as well as in 
financial circles of the City of London.U)
Although it was not a major power, some Western
political leaders considered Czechoslovakia "the keystone
of the post-war arch [in Europe],"17 because of its
strategic geographic position between the East and the
West. Czechoslovak armament production, for instance, was
bigger than that of Italy. Czechoslovakia was the most
industrialized of the East Central European countries; its
heavy industrial capacity surpassed that of all of the
other East-Central European countries combined. It also
15"H . G. Wells' Views About Democracy", 4/172, Noel-Baker 
Collection, Churchill Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge 
University, Cambridge, England, 5,6 (Hereafter NBKR).
16Ernst Eisenlohr to the German Foreign Ministry, 12 
January 1938, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, 
Series D., Vol. II. Washington: United States Government
Printing Office, 1949-1958, 98 (Hereafter DGFP).
17Seton-Watson, "Czechoslovakia in its European Setting,"
110 .
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had very important chemical industries and an excellent-- 
albeit untested— military.18 The Czechoslovak army, when 
fully mobilized, consisted of 1.5 million men; the air 
force had approximately 1,500 planes; and the 
Czechoslovak's military leaders estimated it would take 
three million German troops to overcome them.19 Not only 
was Czechoslovakia industrially and militarily important, 
it was also strategically significant as the gateway to 
Ukrainian oil, the Danubian basin, and the Balkans. During 
the interwar era Britain almost completely overlooked 
Czechoslovakia's industrial and military importance.
During the late 1930s, Chamberlain and the Western leaders 
may have intentionally ignored this importance because of 
their efforts to avoid war.
18Hubert Ripka, "Czechoslovakia--The Key to the Danubian 
Basin," Slavonic and East European Review (10 June 1938): 59- 
62 .
^Correspondent in South East Europe, "Hitler's Real 
Objective?" Spectator. (2 September 1938): 361.
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CHAPTER 3 
DIPLOMACY OF APPEASEMENT
Though not the mastermind of appeasement, Chamberlain 
is probably its best-known proponent. Chamberlain chose 
the diplomacy of appeasement as strategy for avoiding a 
second world war. As part of a generation of French, 
British, and German leaders who had experienced the horrors 
of war either as soldiers or civilians--the so-called "lost 
generation"--he embraced appeasement as the logical policy 
for avoiding another international confrontation. These 
men were products of an era that, while tired of war, was 
regularly reminded of it by mangled war veterans, war 
memorials, and ruins of buildings. Some members of 
Chamberlain's generation feared a repetition of the 
communist revolutions which took place during and after the 
First World War. They feared that if another war occurred, 
all of Europe might fall to Bolshevism. They also believed 
that since Hitler was violently anti-bolshevik, Germany 
would serve as a barrier that helped contain communism in 
Russia. Stanley Baldwin, Chamberlain's predecessor, had 
declared, "If Hitler moves east, it shall not break my 
heart."20 In the 1930s, Britain, more than any other 
country in Europe, had renounced the political extreme of
20Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century. 418.
13
communism.21
For Chamberlain appeasement seemed the only logical
course for Great Britain to take. He studied problems and
issues thoroughly and made decisions following careful
analysis. Once he made a decision he took a very single
minded approach to solving any problem. Lord Edward
Halifax, Chamberlain's foreign secretary from 1938 to 1940
and an advocate of appeasement, remarked:
Anyone who worked with him and I suppose I
worked as closely with him as anybody, was
bound to be impressed by two things. One was 
his complete disinterestedness and disregard 
of any lesser thoughts of self, and the other 
his unfaltering courage and tenacity, once he 
had made up his mind that a thing was 
right.22
Chamberlain's appeasement policy embodied this resolve and 
this tightly focused commitment kept him from listening to 
any dissenting voices. That he could always get a majority 
in Parliament made him even more intractable. Various 
Members of Parliament (MPs) were also appeasers and they 
staunchly defended Chamberlain's policy, some even after 
the German invasion of Poland. On 9 October 1939, Howard
Williams, an MP and an appeaser, wrote to MP Phillip Noel
Baker, a staunch anti-appeaser, that the "pursuit of war to
21Benny Morris, The Roots of Appeasement: The British
Weekly Press and Nazi Germany During the 1930s (London: 
Frank Cass and Co. Ltd, 1991), 2.
22Larry William Fuchser, Neville Chamberlain and 
Appeasement: A Study in the Politics of History. (New York:
W. W. Norton and Company, 1982), 32.
14
the bitter end...cannot possibly lead to any improvement in 
the condition of the world." He continued, "What is 
required is a new attitude towards world settlement, based 
on willing renunciation of privilege and power."23
Chamberlain believed Nazism was a disease that
resulted from the Versailles Treaty and could best be cured
by systematically removing the sources of Hitler's
frustrations. France, Great Britain, Italy, and the United
States formulated the Treaty of Versailles, and the Germans
were excluded from the negotiations and allowed to reply
only in writing. The treaty dealt ruthlessly with Germany
not only in its financial demands but also in placing all
the blame for the war on the shoulders of the German
people. Article 231 of the treaty, known as the “War-guilt
clause," declared that:
responsibility of Germany and her allies for 
causing all the loss and damage to which the 
Allied and Associated Governments and their 
nationals have been subjected as a consequence of 
the war imposed upon them by the aggression of 
Germany and her allies.24
Almost before the Treaty of Versailles was signed, 
German leaders representing most shades of the political 
spectrum labeled it an unjust Diktat and began calling for 
its revision. Political voices from outside Germany, 
including some influential British politicians, soon
23Howard Williams to Philip Noel-Baker, 4/47, 9 October 
1939, NBKR.
24Eubank, The Origins of World War II: 6.
15
supported these calls. In fact, by the end of the 1920s, 
most educated Britons were convinced that all of the great 
powers were responsible for the First World War.25 
Although there was no fofmal revision of the treaty, the 
Western powers spent much of the 1930s trying to 
accommodate Germany in part because of the "unjustness" of 
the war guilt clause. Many historians claimed "that both 
Britain and Germany shared responsibility for the outbreak 
of the war...the Treaty of Versailles was unjust and should 
be revised."26
Hitler condemned the Treaty of Versailles as the 
source for many of Germany's problems, such as the 
worldwide depression which hit Germany earlier and harder 
than any other European country but which also ended 
relatively quickly there. The depression was not a direct 
result of the treaty, but merely an unfortunate event that 
Hitler used to his political advantage. Hitler's seizure 
of power came at an ideal time for him, because he took 
control when Germany was beginning to recover from the 
depression. He portrayed the Treaty of Versailles as a 
Diktat that forced Germany to take responsibility for 
starting the First World War when in reality, the Germans 
believed that no such responsibility existed. When Hitler 
failed to comply with obligations placed on Germany by the
25Morris, Roots of Appeasement. 4.
26Eubank, The Origins of World War II, 3-13.
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treaty, Western powers and the appeasers excused Hitler's 
actions as simply righting the wrongs of the Versailles 
Treaty.
In 1938, Ernst Eisenlohr, the German Ambassador in 
Prague, informed the German Foreign Ministry that the 
British government followed a "policy of eliminating points 
of friction in Europe in such a way as to avoid raising the 
major problems which lie behind them."27 Chamberlain 
believed strongly that his strategy of appeasement was the 
"only one which is likely to lead us to our goal."28 He 
had, of course, plausible, if inaccurate, reasons for 
adopting this policy. One of the most important was the 
depression which had hit Europe in 1929. Britain 
experienced severe social and economic dislocation and 
Chamberlain believed that domestic issues should take 
precedence over foreign ones. Foreign policy kept the 
Prime Minister from concentrating solely on domestic 
issues. He clung to the hope that by succeeding in foreign 
policy he would be able to accomplish his domestic goals of 
revitalizing the British economy.
Once Chamberlain had adopted a strategy for 
appeasement, he began a strategy to eliminate all 
opposition to his foreign policy. With his policy in place
27Eisenlohr to the German Foreign Ministry, 12 January 
1938, DGFP 1918-1945. Series D., Vol. II, 98.
28Neville Chamberlain. In Search of Peace (Freeport, NY: 
Books for Libraries Press, 1939), 91.
17
and with a secure hold over the government, Chamberlain 
wrote confidently in October 1937, "I am quite sure we 
shall never again send to the continent an Army on the 
scale of that which we put into the field in the Great 
War."29 By 1938 he had proved his confidence by gaining 
control of the British rearmament program and 
systematically silencing those who opposed him. Two of 
these critics were Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and Head 
of the Admiralty Duff Cooper, both of whom resigned under 
pressure. On 25 February 1938, Winston Churchill, an 
ardent foe of appeasement, wrote regretfully of Eden's 
departure:
The resignation of Mr. Eden may well be a 
milestone in history... That there was a 
complete divergence between Mr. Eden and the 
Prime Minister was plainly apparent. Mr.
Eden adhered to the old policy which we 
[Great Britain] have followed so long [rule 
of law in Europe], and the Prime Minister and 
his colleagues have entered upon another new 
path.30
After Eden and Cooper departed, Chamberlain never brought 
anyone into the cabinet who held views on foreign policy 
which differed from his own.31
One of the biggest foreign policy dilemmas Chamberlain 
faced was the increasing tension between Berlin and Prague
29Ibid, 85.
30"Good Week for Dictators," Manchester Guardian, (25 
February 1938): 151.
3lWilliam Rock, British Appeasement in the 1930s (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1977), 60.
18
over the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia. Britain was 
forced to handle the Sudeten German problem because of the 
French-Czechoslovak treaty that guaranteed French aid if 
Czechoslovakia were attacked. If France went to war with 
Germany, then many assumed Britain would follow. By the 
time Chamberlain had to make major decisions concerning the 
Sudeten Germans, he was fully committed to his appeasement 
policy. Germany withdrew from the League of Nations in 
1933, remilitarized the Rhineland in March 1936, and 
effected Anschluss [unification] with Austria in March of 
1938 without a hint of disapproval from the British. In 
fact, Britain condoned the last two as German self- 
determination and necessary to maintain world peace. 
Chamberlain remained committed to doing anything necessary 
to appease Hitler and thereby prevent another world war.
The Sudeten German problem concerned the more than 
three million Germans who lived primarily in highly 
industrialized border regions of the Czech Lands. The 
worldwide depression of 1929 hit the Sudeten Lands 
particularly hard because of the region's dependence on 
luxury and export goods. After 1933, Germany's new 
economic emphasis on autarky intensified problems for the 
Sudeten regions by reducing exports to Czechoslovakia.32 
The tendency of the Prague government to invest primarily
32R. W. Seton-Watson, "The German Minority in 
Czechoslovakia" Foreign Affairs (1938): 660.
19
in the Czech-populated interior of the country further 
complicated the situation, as Seton-Watson, an observer 
noted,
Rampant unemployment bred political 
discontent and despair, and the Prague 
Government was faced by a most difficult 
situation in which its efforts to relieve 
distress in any district brought reproaches 
of discrimination from the others.
The Sudeten Germans, like the Reich Germans, blamed their
economic distress on external factors--the Sudeten's blamed
the Czechs and both groups of Germans blamed the Versailles
Peace Settlement. The initiation of a common thread of
discontent began to tie the Nazis and the Sudeten Germans
together, and Hitler was quick to grasp the opportunity.
Hitler was all too aware of the importance of
Czechoslovakia. From May 1935, Berlin began to take an
active interest in the affairs of the Sudeten Germans.34
Hitler used ethnic determination to make claims against
Czechoslovakia on behalf of the Sudeten Germans. When the
Fiihrer began calling for all ethnic Germans outside the
Reich to come Heim ins Reich [home to the Reich], he
specifically focused on the Sudeten Germans because of
Czechoslovakia's strategic importance to Germany. No fewer
than twelve states in Europe had German minorities, but
Hitler targeted only those groups that were useful to him.
33Ibid, 661.
34David Stephens, "Czechoslovakia's German Problem," 
Nineteenth Century (June 1938): 689.
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The Sudeten Germans were especially susceptible to Hitler's 
nationalist rhetoric both because of their difficult 
economic situation and their discontent with their minority 
position in Czechoslovakia.
The Sudetendeutsche Partei (SdP) (Sudeten German 
Party) of Czechoslovakia was not originally tied to the 
National Socialists in Germany, but by the late 1930s 
Hitler had enlisted most of the SdP leadership in the Nazi 
crusade. The SdP became increasingly totalitarian, 
rejecting all other Sudeten German political parties, and 
in foreign policy followed Germany in opposing the League 
of Nations, the Little Entente, and the Czechoslovak pacts 
with France and Russia.33 Konrad Henlein, the founder of 
the SdP, "openly welcomed the achievement of 'Greater 
Germany' and summoned all his co-nationals in the Republic 
to join a single people's front."36
350n the development of the SdP see: Ronald M. Smelser
The Sudeten Problem 1933-1938: Volkstumspolitik and the
Formulation of Nazi Foreign Policy (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan
University Press, 1975). Some Sudeten Germans did oppose 
Hitler particularly members of the German Social Democratic 
Party. For their role in the events of Munich as well as 
wartime relations with Benes, see also Wenzel Jaksch, Europas 
Wecr nach Potsdam (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt,
1958) .
36Seton-Watson, "The German Minority in Czechoslovakia," 
664. The Sudeten German Party, formerly the Sudeten German 
Home Front changed its name to accommodate the Czechoslovak 
government who claimed that 'front' was not democratic and 
would not allow participation in elections under that name. 
The name change came in April 1935 coupled with Henlein's 
appointment as chairman to the party. In the May 1935 
elections the SdP surpassed the votes obtained by the leading 
government party with 1,249,530, but under the system of
21
Totalitarianism in the Sudeten German districts did
not coincide well with the democracy practiced in
Czechoslovakia. According to R. W. Seton-Watson, the
foremost British expert on Czechoslovakia during the
interwar era, for that country to "renounce foreign
alliances [as the SdP demanded it] would be nothing short
of national suicide. 1,37 Although strong militarily,
Czechoslovakia was reluctant to take on the German war
machine without Western support.
National suicide was exactly what Hitler had in mind
for Czechoslovakia. Henlein became Hitler's puppet--
willing to sacrifice Czechoslovakia for a German
Volksgemeinschaft [community based on a people or race].
As Seton-Watson noted:
In reality they [Sudeten Germans] are merely 
an excellent tool for the aims of the dynamic 
policy of the Third Reich, which wants to 
extend the so-called German "living space" 
into the Danubian basin and the Balkans.38
Although respected, Seton-Watson's views were not widely
proportional representation it acquired only 44 seats, one 
less than the main governmental party, the Czechoslovak 
Agrarians. J.W. Bruegel, Czechoslovakia Before Munich: The 
German minority problem and the British Appeasement Policy 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 123- 
24. This is an abbreviated English translation of a more 
detailed study of Czech-German relations by J.W. Briigel, 
Tschechen und Deutsche 1918-1938 (Munich: Nymphenburger,
1967).
37Ibid, 665.
38Seton-Watson, "Czechoslovakia--The Key to the Danubian 
Basin," 54.
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shared by the British public or government. If the 
mistreatment of the Sudeten Germans were the main issue for 
Hitler or Chamberlain then why was little said about the 
German minorities in Poland, Hungary or Italy, who were 
ultimately in more dire straits? As a correspondent for 
the British periodical the Spectator wrote on 12 August 
1938 :
From none of these countries would it be 
possible for 30,000 Germans to cross the 
frontier to Breslau, parade before Herr 
Hitler, shake his hand or kiss the hem of his 
garment while their own leader, Konrad 
Henlein, proclaims his undying love and 
loyalty to that same Fiihrer.39
Without Western opposition, Hitler continued to push 
Henlein to make spiraling and ultimately unacceptable 
demands on the Prague government. During the spring and 
summer of 1938, Henlein called for territorial and personal 
autonomy and complete political freedom to practice Nazi 
ideology for the Sudeten Germans. Few of the British 
realized that Henlein was merely a pawn of Hitler's or the 
logic of Hitler's ultimate plans for Eastern Europe. The 
majority of the British governmental leaders and most of 
the British press accepted the Sudeten German "question" as 
a valid one.40
Contrary to what the SdP leadership told the world,
39"The Czechs and Lord Runciman," Spectator (12 August 
1938): 255.
40"Hitler's Real Objective," Spectator (2 September 
1938): 361.
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the plight of the Sudeten Germans was not that severe,
particularly in comparison to the German minorities in
Poland or Hungary. As a reflection of Czechoslovak
democracy they enjoyed more rights, more civil liberties,
and greater political influence than any other minority in
Europe.41 The British government's continued response to
the "Sudeten problem" was to advise Czechoslovakia "to
treat the German minority with more consideration than
heretofore."42 Chamberlain had already decided that
Czechoslovakia was not worth the risk of another world war,
as he wrote to his sister on 20 March 1938:
You only have to look at the map, to see that 
nothing that France or we could do, could 
possibly save Czechoslovakia from being 
overrun by the Germans if they wanted to do 
it... Therefore, we would not help 
Czechoslovakia, she would simply be a pretext 
for going to war with Germany.43
Henlein and Hitler grasped Chamberlain's indifference
toward Czechoslovakia and used it to their advantage. The
ultimate goal of Henlein and the SdP was not to gain more
rights from the Czechoslovak government but to surrender
independence and submit to German control.44 On 2 8 March
41Seton-Watson, "Czechoslovakia--Key to the Danubian 
Basin," 54.
42Eisenlohr to the German Foreign Ministry, 12 January 
1938, DGFP, Series D, Vol II, 98.
43John Toland, Adolf Hitler (New York: Ballantine Books,
1954), 462-63.
44Hubert Ripka, "Czechoslovakia--The Key to the Danubian 
Basin," 57.
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1938, Hitler told Henlein to raise demands unacceptable to 
the Czechoslovak government so that Prague would be unable 
to comply.45 In a speech to the SdP Congress at Karlsbad 
on 24 April 1938, Henlein demanded "a special German state 
with complete self-government and freedom to profess Nazi 
ideology.1,46
A major problem for Prague in submitting to the
Sudeten German demands was that the SdP wanted political
autonomy, and the Czechs and Sudeten Germans were too
intertwined geographically to be easily separated. In
addition to the Sudeten Lands, Germans lived in other areas
of Czechoslovakia, including Prague and enclaves in
Ruthenia and Slovakia. There were about 400,000 Czechs
living in predominately German areas and 750,000 Germans
living in predominantly Czech areas.47 Autonomy for the
Germans in a single geographic unit was simply not
feasible. Henlein understood this, as did the journalist
and close friend of Benes, Hubert Ripka, who wrote:
The revision of Czechoslovak foreign policy 
demanded by Henlein amounts in practice to a 
wish that Czechoslovakia should give up her 
treaties of alliance...[and] accept a place 
in the 'German sphere' (LebensraunO ,48
4SRibbentrop to Eisenlohr, 29 March 1938, DGFP, Series D, 
Vol II, 204.
46Memorandum, 24 April 1938, DGFP, Series D, Vol II, 242.
47Seton-Watson, "The Germans in Czechoslovakia," 657.
48Ripka, "Czechoslovakia--Key to Danubian Basin," 55.
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Seton-Watson noted that Czechoslovakia was "not a 
'Corridor' for Russia to reach Germany, but a corridor for 
Germany to reach the coveted Ukraine, without crossing 
Polish territory. 1,49 He argued that Germany, not Soviet 
Russia, was the country the West should fear. If Germany 
gained control of Czechoslovakia it would have an open path 
to Ukrainian oil. Ultimately, Hitler's interest in 
Czechoslovakia was not over concern for the plight of the 
Sudeten Germans but for the industrial strength of their 
country.
British leaders failed to appreciate Czechoslovakia's 
industrial worth, geographic importance, strategic 
location, or Hitler's broader intentions. Chamberlain 
claimed on 18 March 1938 that Hitler's intent was simply 
"to include all Germans in the Reich but not to include 
other nationalities."50 Thus, just as Hitler considered 
Henlein a pawn to gain Lebensraum for the German people, 
Chamberlain used Czechoslovakia as a pawn to appease 
Hitler. Chamberlain continued to encourage President Benes 
and the Prague government to do everything in their power 
to come to terms with the SdP. In June 1938, a British 
correspondent in Prague wrote:
Under pressure, not only from Germany but
49Seton-Watson, "Czechoslovakia in its European Setting,"
120 .
50Telford Taylor, Munich: The Price of Peace (Garden
City, NY: Doubleday. and Company, Inc., 1979 ), 626.
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also from the West, to avoid any measures 
which might be represented as provocative, 
the Czech authorities have virtually given 
the Henlein Party a free hand. The Hitler 
salute has become an every-day greeting, 
though the Nazi Party and its practices have 
been officially forbidden since 1933.51
Because it held no treaty with Czechoslovakia, Britain
had only its integrity at stake if that country were
attacked. France's treaty with Czechoslovakia did not
commit Britain to aid Czechoslovakia but Britain was
compelled to come to the defense of France if it were
attacked; therefore, Britain pressured Paris "to put it to
sleep" or bury it [the Czechoslovak-French Treaty].52 In
short, Chamberlain felt obligated to "the establishment and
the maintenance of peace and the removal...of all causes of
possible conflict in the amelioration of grievances between
one country and another."53 The British military situation
was another important reason for Chamberlain's commitment
to appeasement. Britain had demobilized and disarmed after
the First World War and was ill prepared militarily for
another military confrontation with Germany. This lack of
preparation was due largely to the fact that Chamberlain
assumed that another world war would look nothing like the
first. He projected the air force and the navy as the most
51"Czechs and Germans," New Statesman and Nation (4 June 
1938): 941.
52London Embassy to Germany Foreign Ministry, 6 May 1938, 
DGFP, Vol. II, 258.
53Chamberlain, In Search of Peace, 149.
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important factors and dismissed the regular army as
obsolete. In October 1936, he declared:
I cannot believe that the next war, if it 
ever comes, will be like the last one,...and 
I believe our resources will be more 
profitably employed in the air, and on the 
sea, than in building up great armies...We 
should aim at an Army of 4 divisions plus 1 
mobile division ....Territorials should be 
kept for A.A. [antiaircraft] defence.54
On 26 June 1938, Chamberlain wrote to parliament, "[War]
we could not do, unless we had a reasonable prospect of
being able to beat her [Germany] to her knees in a
reasonable time and of that I see no sign. 1,55
Hitler had been preparing for war since his seizure of
power in 1933. After the First World War the German army
was reduced to 100,000 officers and men who served a
twelve-year term of enlistment. Under Hans von Seeckt,
chief of the German Army command, the Wehrmacht was turned
into a school to train enlisted men and encourage the
officers to formulate new tactical doctrines, study foreign
military strategies, and produce studies on the uses of new
weapons. Seeckt was adept at sidestepping the limitations
imposed upon the army by the Versailles treaty and the
Allied Control Commission. By 1933, when Hitler seized
power, he had a strong foundation on which to build his
54Taylor, Munich: The Price of Peace. 593.
55Toland, Adolf Hitler. 463.
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military.56
Having reconstructed German military might, Hitler
cunningly used the West's own policy of self-determination
to justify Sudeten Germans demands on Prague. Chamberlain,
continued to attempt to negotiate with Hitler by treating
him as he would a British politician in the Parliament. In
a speech on 25 February 1938, Churchill described
Chamberlain's new policy as follows:
The new policy is, perhaps, to come to terms 
with the totalitarian powers in hope that by 
great and far-reaching acts of submission, 
not merely in sentiment and pride, but in 
material matters, peace may be preserved. I
earnestly hope that Ministers will take 
occasion to deny that suggestion and will 
explain their policy more fully.57
Due to his miscalculation Chamberlain believed that Hitler
was a rational human being who would listen to the voice of
reason. Even after Germany had remilitarized the
Rhineland, pulled out of the League of Nations, occupied
Austria, and was drooling over Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain
still stubbornly thought that Hitler wanted to solve
problems peacefully. He ignored the fact that Germany was
heavily armed and was preparing for another war and clung
to his mistaken policy of appeasement.58
56Eubank, The Origins of World War II. 5-30.
57"Good Week for Dictators," 151.
58Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, 96,97.
CHAPTER 4
PRELUDE TO MUNICH
British public opinion was not unanimously behind
Chamberlain and the supporters of appeasement. Dissenting
voices were raised beginning in March 1938 following the
Anschluss as the following excerpts from the Times (London)
demonstrate:
With the absorption of Austria, Germany is in 
so commanding a position, politically and 
economically, that she can envisage self- 
sufficiency in Europe— self-sufficiency based 
on the grain and raw materials of Eastern 
Europe....39
and:
Mr. Chamberlain must have pressing reasons 
for his course of parleying with the 
dictators, but says there is as much chance 
of building a safe and settled peace with 
these ravening wolves as the shepherd of a 
tempting flock of sheep would have under the 
circumstances.60
Blinded by his own determination to make a mistaken 
policy successful, Chamberlain also displayed an ignorance 
of Czechoslovakia in his choice of representatives to
59"Defections in Prague," Times (London), (24 March 
1938): 13.
60"Canadian Criticism of Mr. Chamberlain," Times 
(London), (23 February 1938): 13b.
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mediate the conflict between the Czechoslovak government 
and the Sudeten Germans. On 3 August 19 38, he dispatched 
Lord Runciman, a wealthy businessman, who lacked knowledge 
of East Central Europe in general and the Sudeten Germans 
in particular, to negotiate an accord between the SdP and 
the Czech government. On 27 July 1938, Halifax told the 
Parliament that Runciman's mission was "to inform public 
opinion...but, more important, to act as mediator and bring 
the two sides together."6I After a month of contentious 
meetings between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechoslovak 
government, on 13 September 1938 Runciman came to the 
conclusion that the best solution to the Sudeten German 
dilemma was cession of the major Sudeten enclaves to 
Germany.62 Opponents of appeasement rejected Runciman's 
conclusions, but Chamberlain and his supporter continually 
ignored these objections. They tried endlessly to silence 
the dissenting voices and even the London Times 
correspondent in Berlin who tried to tell "the truth about 
the Nazis and the futility of appeasement" was dismissed.63
The Times correspondent was not the only voice
61Lord Halifax as quoted by George Glasgow, "Foreign 
Affairs: Czechoslovakia as Victim," Contemporary Review, (12 
September 1938): 489.
62Chamberlain, In Search of Peace. 164.
63Paul Emrys-Evans to Harold Nicolson, 18 August 1938, 
58262, P.V. Emrys-Evans Papers, British Library, Department 
of Manuscripts, London, England, 54, (Hereafter PVEE).
reporting Hitler's true intentions. Nigel Law, who once 
held a position in the British Diplomatic Service, wrote: 
"...a month ago Hitler explained to his Army Chiefs that 
his 'political intuition’ told him that neither France nor 
Great Britain (since Parliament was not sitting) would move 
if he got into Czecho Slovakia quickly. 1,64 The anti- 
appeasers persevered in their battle for an audience in the 
House of Commons but were continually ignored and dismissed 
as war mongers by Chamberlain's majority. Colonel 
Wedgwood, an anti-appeaser, pleaded with Parliament on 26 
July 1938 to face the reality of Britain's pathetic 
military preparedness: "...we have secured peace, but ...a 
peace which can only be maintained ultimately by a war into 
which we shall go shackled and handcuffed."65 Wedgwood, 
like most of the anti-appeasers, did not favor war but 
wanted to be prepared if it transpired.
Desperate to maintain peace Chamberlain listened to 
Runciman. The Prime Minister told Hitler in the spring of 
1938, "I cannot believe that you will take responsibility 
of starting a world war which may end civilization for the 
sake of a few days delay in settling this long standing
64Nigel Law to P.V. Emrys Evans, PVEE 582 62, 5 September 
1938, 55.
65Colonel Wedgwood, Parliamentary Debates, Fifth Series, 
vol. 338. House of Commons official Report, Monday 4 July 
1938 to Friday 29 July 1938, 2994.
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problem. 1,66 On 14 September 1938, Chamberlain sent a 
message to Hitler requesting a meeting to discuss the 
Sudeten Germans, and on 15 September 1938 he traveled to 
Berchtesgaden.67 Chamberlain told Hitler that he was 
"ready to put to the Czech Government your proposal as to 
the areas [Sudeten Lands], so that they may examine the 
suggested provisional boundary."68 Chamberlain left this 
meeting convinced that Hitler was willing to fight; Hitler, 
on the contrary, was convinced that Chamberlain was not.
The proposals made during the meeting were delivered to 
Prague on 19 September 1938 and demanded an immediate reply 
from Benes.
The most difficult aspect of the deliberations for 
Benes was the knowledge that he was waging an illusory 
fight.69 The real issue was not the ills of the Sudeten 
Germans but the unwillingness of the British and French to 
go to war for the sake of Czechoslovakia. The Czech leader 
originally rejected the proposals which meant the 
destruction of Czechoslovakia but realized that without 
Allied support the Czechoslovak military could not
66Jiri Dolejal and Jan Kren, eds., Czechoslovakia's
Fight:____ Documents on the Resistance Movement of the
Czechoslovak People, 1938-1945. (Prague: Nakladtelstvi
Ceskoslovenski Akademie Ved, 1964), 17.
67Chamberlain, In Search of Peace, 166.
68Ibid.
69H . W. H., "Salute to Benes," Spectator (16 September 
1938): 431.
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withstand a German Blitzkrieg for long.
Acutely aware of the dangers of having a weak 
military, when he took the office of President of 
Czechoslovakia in 1937, Benes' "first principal reform was 
to establish a Supreme Council for the Defence of the 
State." Thereafter, "the Officers' Corps of the army was 
strengthened and fully equipped [and] in the late summer of 
1938 our army,...[was] one of the best in Europe."70 
Benes, unlike Chamberlain, was not blinded by Hitler's 
rhetoric and had taken concerted measures to prepare 
Czechoslovakia for war. Since England decided to 
discontinue its campaign for a balance of power on the 
continent and France gave up its policy of collective 
security, Benes's efforts were insufficient when 
Czechoslovakia was left to defend itself against the German 
war machine. "Czechoslovakia stood, as it were, for a 
cause in which Europe and humanity at large were no longer 
interested."71 With Britain and France threatening to 
withhold military support, Benes was forced on 21 September 
1938 to accept the proposals.
Hitler and Chamberlain met again in Bad Godesberg, 
Germany on 22 September 1938. Britain agreed to the 
peaceful transfer of lands to the Germans; any show of
70Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes. 28, 29.
71Shiela Grant Duff, "The Czechs and the Crisis," 
Contemporary Review. (January-June 1938): 670.
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force by the Germans would be just cause for the Czechs to
resist. Hitler initially consented to withdraw the German
troops from the disputed areas. In a letter to Chamberlain
on 23 September 1938 he renounced his earlier agreement:
I am, however, not prepared to allow a 
territory which must be considered as 
belonging to Germany, on the ground of the 
will of the people and of the recognition 
granted even by the Czechs, to be left 
without the protection of the Reich. There 
is here no international power or agreement 
which would have the right to take precedence 
over German right.72
Hitler went on to argue that the Sudeten Germans would be
virtually defenseless without German protection and set a
deadline of 1 October 1938 for the British to accept German
terms--promising that if this were granted it would be the
last of the German demands and peace would be guaranteed.
Hitler turned the tables on Chamberlain when they met
in Bad Godesberg, claiming that if the Czechs did not
withdraw their forces from the border lands, the West would
be responsible if war erupted. Chamberlain wilted under
Hitler's Godesberg ultimatum and claimed that peace was no
longer in his hands but in the hands of the Czech
government.73 Back in Britain, on 2 3 September 19 38 in a
national broadcast, Chamberlain said:
However much we may sympathize with a small 
nation confronted by a big and powerful 
neighbor, we cannot in all circumstances
72Chamberlain, In Search of Peace. 169.
73 Ibid, 172.
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undertake to involve the whole British Empire 
in war simply on her account.... If we have to 
fight it will be on larger issues than 
that.74
London and Paris concluded that the only way to
avoid another world war was to support Sudeten German
demands for self-determination. This would also allow
France to disregard its treaty with Czechoslovakia. The
British and French governments pressured Czechoslovakia to
comply with the demand for immediate transfer of all areas
having a population of more than fifty percent Sudeten
Germans. The decision was made without the consultation of
the British or the French parliaments or the Czechoslovak
government.75 The Prague government was
informed that if we did not accept their 
[Britain and France] plan for the cession of 
the so-called Sudeten regions, they would 
leave us to our fate, which, they said, we 
had brought upon ourselves. They explained 
that they certainly would not go to war with 
Germany just 'to keep the Sudeten Germans in 
Czechoslovakia. 176
The British government pledged to defend the corollary
Czechoslovak boundaries and promised aid if future German
aggression should occur. Bereft of Western allies,
Czechoslovakia had no choice but to succumb to the German
74Ibid, 175.
75"Dismemberment of Destruction," Spectator (23 September 
1938): 465.
76Benes, Memoirs of Dr. Edvard Benes, 43.
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demands.77 A journalist in the British Spectator wrote:
So Herr von Ribbentrop was right....[He] 
assured Herr Hitler that Great Britain did 
not mean business. The British Government 
had been ceaselessly insisting that it 
did...it is tragic that the discovery that 
they [Britain and France] could not help 
Czechoslovakia was only made when they had
led the Czechs (and all the world) to believe
they could...nothing could be more grossly 
and palpably unfair.78
Churchill and Eden also immediately condemned the act but
remained optimistic that a united stand against German
aggression might yet succeed.77 On 28 September 1938 Jan
Masaryk, the Czechoslovak ambassador to Britain, told
Halifax and Chamberlain, "If you have sacrificed my nation
to preserve the peace of the world, I will be the first to
applaud you, but if no, gentlemen, God help your souls."80
After receiving news of Benes' acceptance of German
demands, Hitler sent a memorandum to Chamberlain on 28
September 1938 calling a meeting to finalize the
concessions. The next day Adolf Hitler, Edouard Daladier,
Benito Mussolini, and Neville Chamberlain, representing
Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, met in Munich to
determine the fate of the Sudeten Germans and of
77Chamberlain, In Search of Peace, 189.
78"What Hitler's Victory Means," Spectator (23 September 
1938), 468.
79"Dismemberment or Destruction," 465.
80Charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars 1918-1940 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 617.
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Czechoslovakia. Neither Czechoslovakia nor its eastern 
ally, the Soviet Union, was present. The Four Powers 
concluded an agreement which called for the Czechoslovak 
government to remove its troops from the specified areas by 
1 October 1938 without destroying any existing 
installations. Occupation of the predominately Sudeten 
German areas by Reich German troops would begin the same 
day. Following the occupation, a plebiscite would be held 
in the annexed lands no later than November to decide on a 
new government. Finally, the Prague government was to 
release, within four weeks, both unwilling Sudeten Germans 
from the Czechoslovak military and any Sudeten Germans 
being held for political offenses.81 On 30 September 
1938, Hitler and Chamberlain signed an Anglo-German 
Declaration which stated: "We [Hitler and Chamberlain] 
regard the agreement signed last night...as symbolic of the 
desire of our two peoples never to go to war with one 
another again."82 On the morning of 30 September 1938, the 
Four Powers presented Czechoslovakia with a fait accompli 
which the Prague government had no choice but to accept. 
Benes was unable to consult the Czechoslovak parliament or 
get any insight into public opinion because the Allies
81Walter Consuelo Langsam, Historic Documents of World 
War II (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1958),
10- 1 2 .
82The Anglo-German Declaration, DGFP, 30 September 1938,
1017 .
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demanded his answer within two hours.83 As Benes noted:
Without our [Czechoslovak] participation and 
in spite of the mobilization of our whole 
Army, the Munich Agreement--fatal for Europe 
and the whole world--was concluded and 
signed. . .and then was forced upon us.84
Initially Chamberlain believed that his appeasement
policy had successfully prevented another war. On 30
September 1938, he told the British people that he had
achieved both "peace with honor" and "peace for our
time."85 Chamberlain's opponents were not deceived by
Hitler's promises and were disgusted at the grandiose
display put on by Chamberlain upon his return from Germany.
Arthur Vivian-Neal, who opposed appeasement, described his
view of Chamberlain's return:
At this distance from Downing Street the 
cheering and the flowers seem utterly 
repulsive, and it seems that we have only 
been able to buy peace...at the price of the 
disgrace of France and our dishonour. Does 
the man [Chamberlain] still suppose that he 
can match with European dictators?86
Obviously he did, for in his speech in the House of Commons
on 3 October 1938, Chamberlain claimed a diplomatic victory
at the Munich conference, declaring that the ultimatum
issued by Hitler at the Godesberg conference was
83Wenzel Jaksch to Gillies, NBKR 4/164, 25 February 1939.
84Benes, Memoirs of Dr. Edvard Benes, 43.
85Chamberlain, In Search of Peace. 200.
86Arthur Vivian-Neal to P.V. Emrys-Evans, PVEE 58262, 2 
October 1938, 60.
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substantially modified in the Munich Agreement.87 
Moreover, Chamberlain believed that Czechoslovakia now had 
a greater degree of security than ever before. The 
majority of the British public supported the policy, and 
every newspaper in the country praised the Munich agreement 
excluding the Reynolds' News.88 "A consensus supporting 
appeasement emerged in the weeklies in the course of 1935, 
and it remained virtually intact until September 1938 .1,89 
Instead of formulating a thorough foreign policy, 
Chamberlain chose to follow the consensus, ignoring a vital 
segment of the government simply because their opinions 
differed from his own.
87W. Jaksch to [ ] Gillies, NBKR 4/164.
88Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, XXVII.
89Morris, Roots of Appeasement. 1.
CHAPTER 5
AFTERMATH OF MUNICH
Chamberlain's opponents in the British Parliament were 
flabbergasted at the Munich settlement. One group of anti- 
appeasers, led by Duff Cooper, were appalled at the 
willingness of Chamberlain to sacrifice a country whose 
military capabilities were so superior. Cooper, when 
informed of the agreement, resigned his post as Head of the 
Admiralty and called the Munich Agreement a "miserable 
scrap of paper..." and added that although he may have 
ruined his political career by resigning, he could "still 
walk about the world with my head erect."90 Furthermore, 
Cooper added that agreeing to "the destruction of the only 
defensible frontier of Czecho-Slovakia, we [Britain] 
guaranteed that frontier." He added that it made no sense 
that Britain "had guaranteed the maintenance of what we had 
just destroyed."91 Cooper and others also believed that if 
the Czechs had fought, Russia might very well have 
supported them. Most of the anti-appeasers, who in any
90Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget, (London: Richard Clay and 
Company Ltd., 1953): 247-48.
91Ibid: 248.
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case, lacked Cooper's military expertise, simply realized
Britain suffered a terrible humiliation at the hands of
Hitler, and assumed the humiliation would not end as long
as the policy continued. All the opponents of the
appeasement policy believed that war was imminent and
Britain would not be able to rearm quickly enough because
of Chamberlain's deluded dream of peace.92 On 16 September
1938 Eden wrote: "I fear that in the end it may boil down
to one more surrender which we shall be asked to call
'peace'."93 In a speech to the House of Commons on 4
October 1938, Lord Lloyd, an M.P. and opponent of
appeasement, said:
There can be no peace in the heart of any 
reflecting man in England when he thinks of 
what was done to the Czech people last week.
Is there nothing worth fighting for?
Justice? We have scarcely heard a word about 
justice in this House.94
When an opponent of appeasement asked Chamberlain whether
any British military adviser had been present at the
conference and whether anyone was consulted before handing
over the Czech fortifications and munitions unimpaired to
92Paul Emrys-Evans to Lord Salisbury, PVEE 58247, 21 July
1943.
93Anthony Eden to P.V. Emrys Evans, PVEE 58242, 16
September 1938.
94Lord Lloyd's speech in House of Commons, PVEE 58247, 4 
October 19 38.
42
Germany, the answer was no.95 Chamberlain was obsessed 
with maintaining peace. Thus, no one who questioned his 
appeasement policy was given a platform, no matter how 
reasonable the criticism.
Peace, however, was not what Hitler wanted. He had 
pushed Chamberlain at every turn and had been so successful 
that he was not about to stop at the borderlands of 
Czechoslovakia. With the Munich Agreement he received more 
land than he demanded in the Godesberg Ultimatum and he saw 
no reason to stop there. Chamberlain and Daladier 
"...could never have realized what they were giving Herr 
Hitler...the whole of Czechoslovakia... lies henceforth 
directly or indirectly in the economic grip of Germany."96
In the ensuing partition of Czechoslovakia, 50 percent 
of the country's industry went to Germany, and 90 percent 
of its fuel resources went to Germany or Poland. Germany 
received about 40 percent of the machine and engineering 
industries and 25 percent of metallurgical and machine- 
making, chemicals, leather, timber, foodstuffs, 
construction, small-scale engineering, and clothing 
industries. Germany also gained 180,000,000 pounds of 
fortifications, armaments, factories and buildings, roads,
95Mr. Benn to Prime Minister,Parliamentary Debates. Fifth 
Series, vol. 339, 28 September 1938 to 3 October 1938, 312.
96"Germany's Czech Colony," New Statesman and Nation (15 
October 1938): 558.
and railways.97 Rump Czechoslovakia, left with little 
industrially, was reduced to an agrarian economy. Of 
strategic importance was the fact that the one country that 
had cut Germany off from Southeastern Europe no longer 
formed that barrier: "The lynch-pin of the mechanism was 
always Czechoslovakia. Once that went, Hungary and Poland 
became fiefs of Berlin.1'98 German rule was immediately 
implemented in the occupied areas and the policy of "No 
German can be subordinated to a Czech. The German is 
always the master"99 was enforced. Even the criteria for 
qualifying as a German were restricted. Those Social 
Democrats who spoke German rather than Czech were refused 
the appellation of "German" because their ideology did not 
match that of the Nazis.100 George Kennan, the American 
Ambassador to Prague, tried to describe the political 
situation in Czechoslovakia: "I wonder whether it is 
possible for anyone...to conceive of the chaos which the 
Munich catastrophe created in political life and political 
thought."101 The political and economic life of the Czechs
97Ibid, 558-59.
98Ibid, 559.
" Czechoslovakia's Fight. 16 March 1939, 21.
100MaryN. Hawes, "Prague in Peril," Contemporary Review. 
(October 1938), 398.
101GeorgeF. Kennan, From Prague after Munich: Diplomatic 
Papers 1938-1940. (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1968), 7.
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and Slovaks was thrown into complete disarray that would 
take years to sort out.
Many British remained unmoved when Hitler occupied the 
Sudeten Lands in October 1938. They believed with 
Chamberlain that he had done the world a great service by 
preserving the peace. They took Hitler at his word and 
apparently believed that Germany would end its demands.
Some British politicians justified the sacrifice of 
independent Czechoslovakia by claiming it was a saison 
Staat [ephemeral state] which should never have come into 
existence in 1919. Others realized the strategic 
importance of Czechoslovakia and were alarmed. Arthur 
Salter, a Member of Parliament, pointed out on 21 October 
1938 that Britain's strength in central Europe was now 
endangered, for Czechoslovakia was central to the bastion 
and without it a strong defense would be difficult to 
develop.102
For the foes of appeasement the sacrifice of
Czechoslovakia was futile, war was probable, and because of
Chamberlain's foolish policy, England was unprepared
militarily to face the German military. Lt. Colonel C.E.
Stewart on 27 June 1939 wrote:
The spectacle of a British Prime Minister 
'sucking up' to Dictators is neither edifying 
nor encouraging....When it is evident to the 
meanest intelligence that appeasement is a
I02Sir Arthur Salter, M.P., "British Policy Now II," (21 
October 1938), 643.
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hopeless failure, he [Chamberlain] persists 
in his fatuous efforts--a fine fellow indeed 
to lead this People and Country at such a 
time as this.103
On 1 October 1938, Benes was informed via his 
ambassador in Berlin, Vojtech Mastny, that Marshal H. 
Goering, head of the Luftwaffe, commanded Benes' 
resignation as President of Czechoslovakia.104 On 5 
October 1938, Benes, concluding he could better help his 
people from a country not dominated by Germany, resigned 
his post.105 Despite Benes' flight and the obvious 
debacle, Chamberlain and his disciples as late as 9 March 
1939 were notifying the British press that foreign affairs 
were taking a turn for the better.106
103Lt. Colonel C.E. Stewart to P.V. Emrys-Evans, PVEE 
58248, 27 June 1939, 65.
104Benes, Memoirs of Dr. Edvard Benes, 50-51.
105 Ibid.
106Wickham Steed, "What of British Policy," Contemporary 
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CHAPTER 6
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LONG ROAD TO RECOGNITION
Unfortunately, World events did not take a turn for
the better--Hitler did not stop with the Sudeten lands. On
15 March 1939 German troops rolled into rump Czechoslovakia
and 16 March a Reich law was passed making Bohemia and
Moravia a Reich protectorate and Slovakia a German puppet
state.107 On the very day that German troops entered the
protectorate, Chamberlain said:
that there are no differences, however 
serious, that cannot be solved without 
recourse to war, by consultation and 
negotiation, as was laid down in the 
declaration signed by Herr Hitler and myself 
at Munich.108
Even after Chamberlain was informed of the rape of 
Czechoslovakia, he and the majority of the parliament 
voiced no regret but were concerned mainly with defending 
the Munich policy. It was left to Eden to emphasize the 
significance of Hitler's move into Czechoslovakia to the 
British parliament. Eden also called for a cementing of 
national unity, and highlighted the importance of 
collective security against Germany's aggression. He 
continued by asking if there was any M.P. who still 
believed that Hitler would not make any more demands or
107George F. Kennan, From Prague after Munich, 96.
108Wickham Steed, "What of British Policy," 644-45.
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that there would not, if left unchecked, be another victim 
of Germany who was left to choose between resistance or 
surrender.109 Although Chamberlain maintained a majority 
in parliament, public opinion in Great Britain began to 
shift. An journalist in the Spectator on 17 March 1939 
wrote: "Nothing would create more confidence than the entry 
of Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden into the Cabinet."110 Even 
the London Times, which had previously supported 
Chamberlain and his policy, on 15 March called its lead 
article "The Destruction of Czechoslovakia."111 The 
appeasement policy was dead; and even Chamberlain was not 
sufficiently deluded to believe it could persist. 
Chamberlain pledged Britain's support to Poland, and in a 
speech at a National Service rally, Eden endorsed the 
change in policy: "We cannot afford any more relaxation.
I hope to heaven we have no more optimistic speeches about 
golden ages. We can all of us recognize the golden age when 
we see it."112 A.H. Richards, the General Organizing 
Secretary of the Anti-Nazi Council, formed to combat Nazi 
propaganda and to help its victims, wrote to Churchill on 
18 March 1939, "At long last it would appear the Prime
109Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of 
Avon: The Reckoning, (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1965), 
53-55 .
nO"The Rape and After," Spectator (17 March 1939), 433.
luWickham Steed, "What of British Policy," 644.
112Eden, Memoirs of Anthony Eden. 56.
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Minister recognizes that you cannot shoo off dictators with
an umbrella."113
Although Chamberlain changed his opinion of Nazism and
ended his appeasement policy, it was not until September
1939 that he thoroughly perceived the need for decisive
action. He said:
I trust I may live to see the day when 
Hitlerism has been destroyed and a liberated 
Europe has been reestablished. The people of 
France and Great Britain are alike determined 
to put an end once and for all to the 
intolerable strain of living under the 
perpetual threat of Nazi aggression.114
Chamberlain had finally modified his sentiments toward
Hitler but he still staunchly defended the Munich agreement
as legitimate--for to denounce it would mean admitting his
entire policy of appeasement had failed.
Benes was determined to rescind the dictates of the
Munich agreement. After a brief sojourn to the United
States where he served as a Professor at the University of
Chicago, he moved to London on 18 July 1939, joining
several former members of the Czechoslovak government
already there.115 Upon his arrival he was welcomed with a
party given by Eden and Churchill and attended by other
opponents of appeasement, including various politicians,
113Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol. V: 1922- 
1939: The Prophet of Truth. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1977), 1048.
114"Prague-London Letter, " 4/172, NBKR, 8.
115Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes, 81.
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the leader of the Labour Party, Seton-Watson, and several 
journalists, all honoring him and condemning Munich. 
Churchill gave the opening speech and promised "that the 
peace which still has to be established will not be made 
without Czechoslovakia116 The battle for Benes and the 
Czechoslovak government-in-exile would continue but they 
were not alone in their fight--those who had condemned the 
appeasement policy all along were still by their sides.
Benes' first order of business was to set up a 
Czechoslovak legation. The primary objective of the 
legation was to gain political recognition from the other 
Allied powers and thereby place the Czechoslovak 
government-in-exile on an equal basis with other exiled 
governments. Additionally, he wanted the French and 
British to repudiate all the consequences of the Munich 
Agreement, to guarantee Czechoslovakia's pre-Munich 
boarders, and to arrange an appropriate resolution to the 
Sudeten German problem.117 On his brief visit to the 
United States he was assured by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, and by 
Republican and Democratic political leaders that America 
would never acknowledge the violence committed against 
Czechoslovakia and would cooperate with efforts at
116Ibid, 82.
11?Edward Taborsky, "Politics in Exile, 1939-1945," in 
Mamatey and Luza, eds. A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 
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resolution.118 On 19 September 1939, Benes opened political 
negotiations with Halifax but was unable to surmount any 
solid commitment to official recognition. The British 
government was unwilling to make any type of political 
promise to Czechoslovakia for fear of future consequences. 
Chamberlain's government refused to admit that their 
foreign policy had been severely partial and gravely 
flawed.
Immediately after Britain declared war on Germany, 
Benes sent telegrams to the Prime Ministers of Poland, 
France, the British Dominions, and Great Britain, informing 
them that Czechoslovakia had legally existed after 15 March 
1939 and had been at war with Germany since that date.
Benes added that Czechoslovakia would fight along side the 
other Allied powers and began organizing the Czechoslovak 
liberation army which would aid other Allied forces. Benes 
received replies from all the prime ministers, welcoming 
the Czechoslovak support, except from France and Poland 
which considered Czechoslovakia extinct since 15 March
118Ibid, 83. Although the United States promised to 
cooperate, the U.S. was still very isolationist in 1939 and 
made it clear to Britain, through the American Ambassador to 
Great Britain, that the U.S. would not act militarily unless 
directly threatened and certainly had no intentions of going 
to war to save Czechoslovakia. Taylor, Munich: The Price of 
Peace, 766-67, 848-52. For more detailed description of
Roosevelt's foreign policy see, Robert Dallek, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York,
1965) .
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1939 .119
After a brief visit to France, where Benes was 
slighted by Daladier, who was still embarrassed by Munich, 
the Czechoslovak leader met with fellow exiles: Stefan 
Osusky, the former Czechoslovak Minister to Paris, General 
Sergej Ingr, Dr. Eduard Outrata and Dr. Herbert Ripka.120 
Daladier was unwilling to recognize a government he 
considered extinct, so Benes was forced to deal with lesser 
French officials and was only able to establish a 
Czechoslovak National Committee with restricted 
capabilities. The Committee was grudgingly recognized by 
France on 17 November 1939 and by the British on 20 
December 1939. Masaryk in a broadcast to Prague tried to 
encourage those remaining in the protectorate that the 
"Committee" or "Council" was working to regain 
Czechoslovakia's pre-Munich status and boundaries. On 18 
November 1939 he wrote, "a National Council, which has been 
given full powers to represent our nation in all the Allied 
countries... and will remain a devoted and humble servant of 
your sacred cause."121 The National Committee, however, 
did not have all the privileges of a recognized government- 
in-exile and was limited in what it could accomplish.
U9Ibid: 85-88.
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France had once again failed its former ally Czechoslovakia 
and politically handicapped Benes and Masaryk even more.
The legacy of Munich continued to haunt the Czechoslovak 
government, even in exile.
After his brief dealings with the French, Benes 
decided that his time was best spent lobbying the British 
government. Even though the British had renounced the 
appeasement policy, their comprehension of the plight of a 
small nation like Czechoslovakia was very limited. In the 
words of Masaryk, "It is not easy for the large British 
nation to understand what it means for a small nation to be 
fighting for the preservation of its national 
existence."122 Czechoslovakia was a small nation 
surrounded by Germans on three sides and had been fighting 
for survival since the day it was formed. Most Britons 
could not comprehend the Czechoslovaks' fate, making the 
National Committee's job ever more difficult.
Although the National Committee had to temporarily 
remain in Paris to successfully organize the Czechoslovak 
Army, Benes returned to London. Members of the National 
Committee were comprised of Slovaks, Czechs, socialists, 
communists, German Social Democrats, and several other 
groups. The communists were initially involved, ceased to 
cooperate with the committee when the German-Soviet treaty 
was signed on 23 August 1939, and then rejoined when
l22Ibid, 2.
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Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The Sudeten German 
Social Democrats, led by Wenzel Jaksch, also withdrew their 
cooperation when Benes began to pursue the expulsion of the 
Sudeten Germans when the war ended.123
Although the majority of the Committee was in Paris, 
Benes and Masaryk began negotiations with the British 
government in London. Rumors of a German invasion of 
France were circulating and Benes believed that the 
Committee would have to be permanently moved to London. On 
26 April 1940, Benes opened talks through a meeting with 
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of State 
in the British Foreign Office. Benes asked for approval of 
a Czechoslovak Government in London made up of participants 
of the National Committee and additions which would make it 
representative of all the official dealings of the 
Czechoslovak people. Deliberations with the British 
Foreign Office continued through July with extensive 
correspondence and recognition promised in June.124
The primary issue for Benes and the Committee became 
rescuing the Czechoslovak army from France so it could 
continue to fight with the allies for the remainder of the
123Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes: 92-94. On removing 
the "German threat" in post-1945 Czechoslovakia, see John 0. 
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war. Benes wrote to Eden, who had become head of the 
Dominions office and was then appointed Secretary of State 
for War under Churchill's government on 12 May 1940.125 He 
informed Eden that British military support was crucial in 
evacuating Czechoslovak troops from France to Britain.
Eden agreed and promised to help in the rescue and after 
overcoming several obstacles, Czechoslovak troops arrived 
in Britain on 14 July 19 4 0 .126 Upon their arrival, Eden 
sent them a message welcoming them to Britain and promising 
the defeat of their common enemy, Germany.127
With the Czechoslovak forces on British soil, the 
urgency for recognition of a government became even more 
essential. Benes sent a letter to Halifax on 9 July 1940 
asking for recognition of a Provisional Czechoslovak 
Government with a complete state organization. The 
government would consist of: Dr. Edvard Benes, President, 
Dr. Jan Sramek, Prime Minister, and twelve others. The 
government would also include a Czechoslovak State Council 
which would consist of representatives of various political 
Czechoslovak groups and would act as a kind of 
parliament.128 In response, Halifax agreed to recognize 
the Provisional government but emphasized that the British
125Eden, Memoirs of Anthony Eden. 73-74, 112.
126Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes. 103-05.
127 Ibid, 105.
128Ibid, 106-07.
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government did "not intend to engage themselves in advance 
to the recognition or future support in the fixing of 
whatever future boundaries in Central Europe."129 
Essentially, the British government, which still consisted 
of several members of Chamberlain's devotees, were still 
unwilling to recognize the pre-Munich boarders of 
Czechoslovakia. Churchill was in a bind because in war 
time he needed undivided cooperation from the Parliament 
and a total denunciation of Chamberlain's foreign policy 
could have caused internal squabbling which could be 
disastrous at a time when unity was crucial.130 As a 
compromise, therefore, the provisional government was not 
invited to become one of the Allied governments. The 
procrastination by the British especially irritated 
Masaryk, the foreign minister, who signed when writing to 
his friends in the British government, "Provisionally 
yours" and "asked whether the Czechoslovak airmen who were 
killed flying over Britain were provisionally dead."131 
"Provisional" was all the British government would concede 
the Czechoslovak government for fear of having to defend 
its pre-Munich borders after the war. Provisional status 
was not enough to satisfy Benes, but he realized its
129Ibid, 109-10.
130Ibid, 203.
131Z.A.B. Zeman, The Masarvks: The Making of
Czechoslovakia, (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1976), 183.
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importance in securing the ultimate goal of full 
recognition and continued his quest.
The British government did not admit that Munich was 
the reason it refused to give total recognition to Benes' 
government but used other excuses instead. The most 
pronounced demand the British government put on the 
provisional government was to ascertain complete solidarity 
of all political Czechoslovak groups. This proved to be an 
enormous task for Benes because of the puppet government in 
Slovakia which the British gave recognition preceding the 
war and the submissive Emil Hacha government in the 
protectorate also the recipient of British recognition. A 
further concern of the British were the exiled Sudeten 
Germans with leaders like Jaksch, and the communists who 
objected to being under Benes' jurisdiction.132 Jaksch and 
other Sudeten Germans objected to Benes plans for expelling 
"disloyal" Sudeten Germans after the war. The Czechoslovak 
communists blamed Benes for collaborating with other 
"capitalist governments" at Munich since they believed 
Czechoslovakia should have fought in September 19 3 8 .133 A 
resolution sent to Benes on 15 December 1940 by the
132Taborsky, "Politics in Exile, 1939-1945," 327.
133Paul E. Zinner, Communist Strategy and Tactics in 
Czechoslovakia. 1918-1948 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1963), 57-58, 79. After the German attack on the Soviet Union 
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Executive Committee of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia said, they deemed Benes to be in the
"service of British imperialism." It continued in saying
that they considered the
resurrection of the old coalition in the form 
of a Czech emigre 'Government' is a complete 
disclosure of his [Benes] plans to re­
establish the capitalistic rule of the Czech 
bourgeoisie and at the same time a new 
manifestation of the total decrepitude of the 
political representatives of the Czech 
bourgeoisie.334
To many communists, Benes, not Chamberlain was the villain 
of the Munich Agreement and they adamantly refused to 
cooperate in a government with him. Recognition of Benes 
as their President would mean the resignation of the Hacha 
government in Prague and could provoke the Nazis into 
inflicting dreadful repercussions upon those peoples still 
living in those areas. Even Hacha was unwilling to face 
the possible German retribution so refused Benes' request, 
putting Benes in a very difficult position with the British 
government since he had assured them that he possessed 
complete cooperation with the Hacha government.135 
Moreover, some of the emigrants who blamed Benes for the 
fate of their country intentionally tried to undermine the
134Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes, 160-61. In a memo on 
23 June 1941, after the German invasion of the Soviet Union 
the Czechoslovak communist attitude was completely reversed.
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efforts of the provisional government.
Only after several near catastrophes, and only after 
the British government realized its demands for complete 
unity of all political factions, was recognition promised 
to Benes' provisional government. Furthermore, differences 
of status between the Czechoslovak Provisional Government 
and that of other exiled nations caused so many 
uncertainties and problems that the British Foreign Office 
agreed to put an end to the chaos. The process promised to 
be a smooth one, as well, because Eden had succeeded 
Halifax as Foreign Minister on 23 December 1940 and he was 
in favor of full recognition for Benes' government.136
On 10 April 1941, Masaryk and Benes met with Eden and 
tried to stress the importance of full recognition. It 
could not only right a dreadful wrong but also reassure the 
other smaller countries in Eastern Europe of Britain's 
faithfulness.
On 18 April, 1941, Benes handed Eden a memorandum 
comprising of five requests: "Full diplomatic recognition
de jure for the Czechoslovak government," thus legalizing 
the government. The designation of a British Minister 
Plenipotentiary to the Czechoslovak Government (previously 
Bruce Lockhart acted as a 'delegate'). Equality with other 
Allied governments. Use of official titles such as, 
"Czechoslovak Republic" and the "President of the
136Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes. 120-24.
Czechoslovak Republic." Finally, the end of the provisional
character of the government and the resumption of the
Czechoslovak Constitution after the war.137 On 19 April
1941 Benes' luck changed and Churchill visited the
Czechoslovak troops and Benes was able to seize the
occasion to hand him a summary of the requests given to
Eden. Churchill was taken by the vision of the exiled
troops and was further moved when the troops sang "Rule
Britannia" upon his departure. "I thought it rather
moving--all those poor exiles, the tiny remnant of an army
...so pleased to be visited and eager in their welcome."138
Churchill gave the letter to Eden and wrote, "I do not
understand why the Czechs could not have the same status as
the other allies. They deserve it."139 Eden agreed and
gave it to the Foreign Office for additional action. The
granting of these requests would put an end to the Munich
Agreement, making it obsolete, and guaranteeing
Czechoslovakia its pre-Munich borders after the war. On 24
June 1941, Benes sent a message to Hacha asking him to
resign and assuring him that the
time for such a change has come...You at home 
can hardly save anything, while it can only 
help us here and for the future this will 
mean the salvation of the unity of the nation
137 Ibid, 124-25.
138Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Finest Hour, 1939-1941,
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at the worst moment in history.140 
Benes needed the official resignation of the Hacha 
government so he could consolidate control in London.
After a month of negotiations and debates, Eden and 
the British government complied with all the demands except 
the legal continuity of Czechoslovakia, meaning that the 
pre-Munich borders were not guaranteed. With Chamberlain's 
legend continuing to curse Czechoslovakia, the British 
government refused to "recognize or to support any future 
frontiers whatsoever in Central Europe."141 Excluding the 
guarantee of the pre-Munich borders, British recognition 
was granted on 18 July 1941. The Soviet Union 
simultaneously recognized the Benes government and on 31 
July 1941 the United States followed suit.142
But Benes' fight was not over, for although the 
Czechoslovak government-in-exile was now equal with the 
other exiled Allied governments, the British still did not 
guarantee the pre-Munich boundaries of Czechoslovakia. The 
continued existence of several defenders of appeasement in 
the Churchill government made the process very long and 
exhausting for him but he was tenacious and unwilling to
140Jiri Dolejal and Jan Kren, eds. , Czechoslovakia' s 
Fight. 46-47.
141Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes. 126.
142Taborsky, "Politics in Exile, 1939-1945," 328.
Pertinent U.S. documents still listed the Czechoslovak 
government as provisional but was amended on 26 October 1942.
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accept an agreement he considered a Diktat. His fight for
legal continuity of the First Republic was based on two
principles: The Czechoslovak government under intense
pressure to sign the agreement made it legally invalid
according to the Czechoslovak Constitution. Furthermore,
on 15 March 1939, with the German invasion the agreement
was automatically destroyed. Gaining British recognition
of these two points was not an easy task and negotiations
between Benes and Nichols dragged on, preying Benes'
patience. On 9 April 1942 he told Nichols that the Munich
Agreement stood between their two countries and must be
resolved. He added,
I am afraid that you Englishmen with your 
lack of political imagination and foresight 
do not realize what could be the consequences 
of your attitude in postwar Central-European 
and overall European continental politics.143
Benes' threats did not stop there, on 4 June 1942, he told
Eden that it was time to eradicate Munich for the
deliberations were "prolonging themselves indefinitely and
they are beginning to have a bad influence on our mutual
relations."144 Characteristically, Eden agreed, promised
to take over the issue himself, and in July 1942 made Benes
143Taborsky, "Politics in Exile," 331-32.
144Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes. 204.
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a proposal.
The proposition disavowed the Munich Agreement from 15 
March 1938, the date it was violated by the Germans. The 
British government, also refused recognition to anything 
concerning Czechoslovakia in the agreement nor any 
alterations in the Czechoslovak frontiers since 1938. 
Furthermore, the British government further assured Benes 
that it would not be influenced in future negotiations by 
the events of 1938. Benes had finally obtained British 
recognition of his countries’ pre-Munich frontiers but 
still did not secure the legal continuity of his country. 
Benes and his government, however, decided to drop the 
issue of legal continuity, and told Eden that they would 
accept the terms of the agreement with a few minor 
alterations. The final draft was presented by Eden to the 
Parliament on 5 August 1942, ending any further 
negotiations between the British and Czechoslovak 
governments concerning the Munich Agreement.145
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CONCLUSION
Edvard Benes devoted his life from 1918 to 1948 to 
shaping and enriching Czechoslovakia with democratic 
principles and trying to guarantee the survival of the 
principles he and several others worked so hard to 
establish. Collective security, a concept Benes believed 
decisive in avoiding another world war, proved to be a very 
demanding task. Czechoslovakia's five neighbors, Germany, 
Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and Poland, were all hostile.
The Little Entente, including Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, 
and Rumania, was one of Benes' undertakings but proved 
ineffective. His diplomatic relations with the West and 
with the Soviet Union remained strong throughout the 
interwar period. The alliance system Benes established 
seemed foolproof but failed miserably because his allies 
first abandoned him and his country and then helped in its 
dismemberment.
On 15 March 1939, Benes thought he was vindicated, for 
it was obvious to most of the world that appeasing Hitler 
was futile. Benes realized all along that the decision 
made at Munich was only the beginning of Hitler's quest for 
Lebensraum and that Czechoslovakia was not the last victim 
of his campaign. He believed that:
63
64
The whole policy which led to Munich was 
brought to the height of absurdity, was 
demonstrated to be wholly impracticable and 
fundamentally wrong while all those who 
(whether they believed in it or not)
initiated and sponsored it were shown to be
altogether credulous, entirely frivolous and 
manifestly ridiculous.146
Recognition of mistakes and especially one so huge as the
policy of appeasement with its culmination at Munich was
not an easy thing to admit, so even after it was obvious to
most of the world that Chamberlain had made a grave
miscalculation, the British leader and his disciples were
unwilling to admit the complete failure of their policy.
What Benes thought would be an immediate reversal of the
Munich Agreement turned into a much longer and more
wearisome task. All the politicians who formulated the
Munich Agreement were still in power when the war began,
making it difficult for Benes to correct the repercussions
of the Diktat.147
The appeasement policy caused the political, social,
and economic desolation of Benes' once stable country.
146Ibid, 197.
147The expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from 
Czechoslovakia after the war remains an unresolved issue for 
the Czech government. For more information see: Radomir
Luza, The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans: A Study in German 
Relations. 1933-1962 (New York: New York University Press, 
1964. Alfred de Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Expulsion of 
the Germans From the East, 3rd ed. , revised (University of 
Nebraska Press, 1988), is one of the few English-language 
publications sympathetic to the Sudeten German expellees. 
Pertinent Document Collections include Fritz Peter Habel, 
Dokumente zur Sudetenfrage, 2nd ed. (Munich: Langen Muller, 
1984) .
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Czechoslovakia's natural barriers were circumvented, 
leaving an unobstructed passage for Hitler's forces to 
march into the once defensible country and terrorize its 
peoples. Chamberlain's policy of appeasement was shallow, 
irrational, and inflexible. Eden, Churchill, Cooper, and 
other opponents of the appeasement policy were experienced 
politicians, well versed in foreign policy and military 
strategies. They were constantly ignored and stifled by 
Chamberlain and his followers. Appeasement developed into 
a policy with only one goal-avoiding war at any cost-even 
if it meant sacrificing a blameless country. For 
Chamberlain, Czechoslovakia was only a "far away country of 
which I know nothing"--a country that could be sacrificed 
to avoid another world war.
Had Chamberlain succeeded and Hitler not gone on to 
attack Poland in September 1939, Chamberlain might today be 
hailed as a great hero and diplomat. By sacrificing 
Czechoslovak independence to Germany as a form of 
restitution for the injustices of the Versailles Treaty in 
1938, Chamberlain would have prevented another world war. 
Appeasement would be hailed as a great strategy when 
dealing with dictators. Unfortunately, the Sudeten lands 
and Czechoslovakia proved to be another, and in fact 
extremely critical, step in Hitler's march toward world 
war. Those who opposed Chamberlain's appeasement policy 
were correct in their characterization of Hitler and his
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intentions. Chamberlain's great gamble in isolating 
himself from his opposition and making a deal with a 
dictator, proved to be a disastrous mistake not only for 
the Czechs but also for the entire western world. In the 
words of Benes, "In the whole of history of world diplomacy 
there are few errors so fatal, so far-reaching in their 
consequences for all the world as this one!"148
l48Edvard Benes, Memoirs of Edvard Benes: 86.
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